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ABSTRACT
This paper introduces a secure FPGA implementation of a
coprocessor for public key cryptography. It supports Elliptic
Curve Cryptography (ECC) as well as the older RSA stan-
dard. When choosing adequate key lengths, RSA and ECC
are assumed to be secure from an algorithmic point of view.
On the other hand, an implementation of these algorithms
should also guarantee side-channel security. This feature
does not only cause an inevitable performance degradation,
but also an area increase. We overcome these drawbacks
by fitting the public key architecture and algorithms into a
coprocessor that optimally exploites the dedicated features
on a Spartan XC3S4000. Although this is a very low-cost
FPGA, the performance results of our implementation meet
the requirements of a broad range of high-end applications.
1. INTRODUCTION
Public Key Cryptography (PKC) is the basis for security
in many digital information systems. Network applications
such as e-mail, e-commerce and e-banking rely on services
like key establishment and digital signatures to ensure con-
fidentiality, authentication, data integrity, etc. In other ap-
plications like credit cards, PDAs and cell phones, PKC is
used to guarantee embedded security. All these diverse ap-
plications require suitable implementation platforms. For
some systems a general purpose microprocessor suffices the
requirements, but when high performance is the main cri-
terium, cryptographic coprocessors in hardware are indis-
pensable. Examples of high performance applications are
ATMs, trusted computing platforms and biometric devices.
The most widely used PKC standard is RSA, which was
invented by Rivest, Shamir and Aldeman in 1978 [1]. How-
ever, its drawbacks became known when a new standard for
PKC arrived in 1985: Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC),
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proposed by Miller [2] and Koblitz [3], beats RSA in terms
of silicon area and speed. The main reason for this is that
ECC offers the same level of security as RSA with much
shorter key lengths. For example, an RSA public key length
of 1024 bits is equivalent to an ECC public key length of 160
bits. For this reason, research mainly focuses on optimiz-
ing ECC implementations. However, because RSA has been
widely accepted and used, many embedded applications, for
which area or power are not a concern, still use RSA. Never-
theless, in the future many applications will gradually evolve
towards ECC, which introduces a kind of changeover period.
That is why there is a substantial demand for PKC coproces-
sors supporting both RSA and ECC.
In the mid 1990s, Paul Kocher et al. introduced the
concept of side-channel analysis [4, 5]. From then on, it
was common knowledge that countermeasures needed to be
taken for preventing an implementation to leak information
through power consumption, timing, . . . These countermea-
sures have an impact on the performance and the area of the
implementation. To compensate for this area increase, we
have made algorithm and architecture choices that make op-
timal use of the dedicated multipliers and RAM blocks on
the FPGA. This results in a secure implementation on an
XC3S4000, an FPGA from the low-cost Spartan series of
Xilinx.
Section 2 gives an overview of the state-of-the-art in
PKC coprocessors, while Sect. 3 briefly introduces RSA,
ECC and the underlying field operations stressing on the
hardware requirements. The design strategy in Sect. 4.1 ex-
plains how a secure solution is obtained by exploiting the
dedicated features on the FPGA. The resulting implementa-
tion is discussed in Sect. 4.2. Finally, Sect. 5 concludes this
paper.
2. THE STATE-OF-THE-ART IN PKC
COPROCESSORS
This section places our design in a broader context by list-
ing previous work done in the area of PKC coprocessors for
RSA and ECC.
The contribution presented in [6] is combining a systolic
array architecture with a Montgomery based RSA imple-
mentation, achieving the same notion of scalability as intro-
duced in Tenca and Koc¸ [7]. The optimal bound for Mont-
gomery’s parameter R is achieved which, with some savings
in hardware, completely omits all reduction steps that are
presumed to be vulnerable to side-channel attacks.
More recent hardware implementations of RSA include
the work by McIvor et al. [8]. They use Carry Save Adders
(CSAs) to perform the large word length additions required
for Montgomery multiplication.
The work of Crowe et al. [9] proposed a single architec-
ture for RSA and ECC. A hardware optimized version of
Montgomery multiplication is used for modular multiplica-
tion. The so-called dual processor can operate in parallel for
ECC or in a pipelined manner for RSA.
Because RSA and ECC consist of finite field operation,
the performance and area of their implementations depend
heavily on the choice of a suitable multiplier. An overview
of some implementation options for Montgomery multipli-
cation is given by Koc¸ et al. in [10].
3. HARDWARE REQUIREMENTS
In this section, we elaborate on the algorithms we use to im-
plement the operations in RSA and ECC. The reason for
these specific choices of algorithms is part of our design
strategy and will therefore be explained in Sect. 4.1. For
both RSA and ECC, the most crucial operation is modular
multiplication. That is why the last part of this section de-
scribes Montgomery’s Modular Multiplication (MMM) al-
gorithm.
3.1. RSA
In RSA, the main operation for encryption as well as decryp-
tion, as stated in [1], is modular exponentiation. In our PKC
coprocessor this is performed using the m-ary or window
method, shown in Algorithm 1, which gives a substantial
speed-up over binary algorithms [11]. Here g is an element
of a ring with cardinality N (i.e. N is the modulus) and d is
a positive integer.
This method requires the precomputation of some pow-
ers of g, which can be done using Algorithm 2.
In Algorithm 1, the exponent d is evaluated in digits
of m bits. For every digit di, m squarings and one mul-
tiplication modulo N are performed. To prevent Simple
Algorithm 1 m-ary exponentiation
Require: m, gi (i = 0 . . . 2m − 1),
d = (dn−1dn−2 · · · d1d0)2m
Ensure: gd
1: A ← 1
2: for i from n− 1 down to 0 do
3: A ← A2m
4: A ← A · gdi
5: end for
6: Return A
Algorithm 2 Precomputation for m-ary exponentiation
Require: m, g
Ensure: gi, with i = 0 . . . 2m − 1
1: g0 ← 1
2: for i from 1 to 2m − 1 do
3: gi ← gi−1 · g
4: Return gi
5: end for
Power Analysis (SPA) attacks [5, 12], the power consump-
tion traces should look similar for every evaluation of di.
This is obtained by performing the multiplications and the
squarings on the same multiplier instead of using a dedi-
cated squarer. In this way, an attacker cannot distinguish
between the operation by looking at the power consumption
trace.
To prevent Differential Power Analysis (DPA) attacks [5,
12], which use many power consumption traces together
with some statistical analysis, the exponent is “blinded”.
This countermeasure adds a random multiple of ϕ(N) to
the exponent, where ϕ(N) is the Euler totient of the modu-
lus N . In [13], more details are given on exponent blinding.
A speed-up for RSA can be achieved using the Chinese
Remainder Theorem (CRT) [11]. In this case, modular ex-
ponentiation can be performed by two half-size modular ex-
ponentiations. Parallelizing these two exponentiations re-
sults in a speed-up of a factor approximately 4. Two se-
quential exponentiations would almost double the speed.
In terms of hardware requirements for RSA, the copro-
cessor needs a modular multiplier for the exponentiation.
Furthermore, it requires RAM blocks for storing the pre-
computed values gi.
3.2. ECC
In ECC, the equivalent operation of the modular exponentia-
tion in RSA is point multiplication, which multiplies a point
on an elliptic curve with a scalar, resulting in another point
on the curve. The scalar serves as the key, while the coordi-
nates of the points contain the data. In our PKC coprocessor,
point multiplication is performed using Algorithm 3 [14],
where P (x, y) is a point on the elliptic curve with coordi-
nates x and y, k is a positive integer and O is the point at in-
finity, which serves as the identity element for elliptic curve
operations.
Algorithm 3 Right-to-left binary point multiplication
Require: P = (x, y), O, k = (kl−1kl−2 · · · k1k0)2
Ensure: Q = (x′, y′) = kP
1: Q ← O, S ← P
2: for i from 0 to l − 1 do
3: if ki = 1 then
4: Q ← Q+ S
5: end if
6: S ← 2S
7: end for
8: Return Q
To prevent SPA attacks in ECC, the conditional point
addition Q ← Q + S in Algorithm 3, which is only per-
formed when the evaluated key bit is 1, has to be avoided.
This can be done by inserting a dummy point addition when
the key bit is 0. The result of the dummy point addition
will be written to the RAM, but will not be used in the next
iteration of the algorithm.
Equivalent to RSA, resistance against DPA attacks can
be achieved by key blinding [13]. On top of that, we imple-
mented point randomization as another precaution for pre-
venting DPA attacks [13].
In Algorithm 3 the point operations, i.e. point addition
and point doubling, consist of operations in the underlying
field. In more detail, a point addition uses 21 field multipli-
cations and 8 field additions, while a point doubling needs 8
field multiplications and 14 field additions [15].
As can be seen in Algorithm 3, the results of point addi-
tion and point doubling are written to different intermediate
registers Q and S. Moreover, there are no data dependencies
between both operations, which makes it possible to perform
them in parallel in order to double the speed. To guarantee
side-channel security, point doubling and addition need to be
balanced, i.e. the same finite field operation (modular mul-
tiplication or modular addition/subtraction) has to be per-
formed in the same step. This can be achieved by inserting
redundant operations in the algorithm for point doubling, re-
sulting in the same sequence of modular multiplications and
additions for both operations. This parallel approach leads
to the following hardware requirements for the ECC part of
our coprocessor: two modular multipliers and two modular
adders.
3.3. Montgomery Multiplication
The most time and area consuming operation in both RSA
and ECC is modular multiplication. To speed this up, we
implemented Montgomery multiplication which avoids the
trial division that would be needed to perform a straightfor-
ward modular multiplication [16]. In the original algorithm
a final reduction needs to be performed, but this can be omit-
ted by using a modified version where inputs and outputs are
allowed to be bigger than the modulus N [17]. After con-
verting back from Montgomery to normal representation,
e.g. at the end of a modular exponentiation, the result is
ensured to be smaller than N . We adapted this modified al-
gorithm to a version that allows a 16 bit overflow, given in
Algorithm 4. The inputs to the algorithm are two finite field
elements a and b, the modulus N , the Montgomery para-
meter R = 2n+16 (with n = the number of bits of N ) and
N ′ = −N−1 mod R. The result of the Montgomery mul-
Algorithm 4 Montgomery multiplication without final sub-
traction
Require: a, b, N , R, N ′
Ensure: a · b ·R−1 mod N
1: u ← a · b ·N ′ mod R
2: t ← (a · b+ u ·N)/R
3: Return t
tiplication is the modular multiplication of a and b divided
by R. To implement Algorithm 4, an integer multiplier and
an integer adder are needed.
4. OUR PKC COPROCESSOR
In the previous section we elaborated on the hardware re-
quirements for the data path of our coprocessor. The first
part of this section focuses on the design strategy. This re-
sults in a detailed description of the implementation, which
is described in the second part.
4.1. Design Strategy
In order to meet the hardware requirements in Sect. 3, the
coprocessor needs an integer multiplier and an integer adder.
The multiplier is the most crucial component in terms of
area and speed. It is used for performing the integer multi-
plications in Alg. 4, needed for both RSA and ECC. In addi-
tion, RSA using CRT (as explained in Sect. 3) also performs
modular multiplications. This means we need to implement
a multiplier capable of handling many word lengths: for
RSA, a minimum of 1024 bits is required, while ECC needs
at least 160 bits. Using CRT for RSA would result in a word
length of at least 512 bits.
In order to provide side-channel security, the operations
should be balanced as much as possible. Batina et al. elab-
orate on this in [18]. This means that conditional branches
should be avoided at any time and, if possible, parallelism
should be introduced to make it harder to distinguish be-
tween operations using power consumption traces.
Fig. 1. Multiplier
Because our aim is to implement a public key coproces-
sor on a low-cost FPGA, like a Spartan, it is not feasible
to foresee two parallel 1024 bit multipliers for RSA. That
is why we choose for Alg. 1, which uses multiplications in
a sequential manner without any conditional branches. For
the equivalent operation with CRT, it is possible to use two
parallel 512 bit multipliers. Thus, we implement a 1024 bit
multiplier that can be configured as two separate 512 bit
multipliers. Also for ECC, with a much smaller operand
size, parallelism can be exploited. This results in an imple-
mentation of Alg. 3, where the problem of the conditional
branch is solved by always performing a point addition and
a point doubling, independent of the key bit.
In summary, we need a multiplier with three configura-
tion options:
• one 1024 bit multiplication
• two 512 bit multiplications in parallel
• two 256 bit multiplications in parallel
The data path requires a width of 1024 bits, which is quite
big. This makes the use of the “free” dedicated features on
the FPGA a necessity. The integer multiplications in Alg. 4
can be performed using Fig. 1, where the multiplier blocks
at the top are FPGA-dedicated 16x16 unsigned multipliers.
The big signal decides on the configuration option. In the
parallel option, tleft and tright are the output signals, while
yleft and yright are the digit-serial inputs. When the multi-
plier is used for one big multiplication, tright is the output
signal, while yright is the digit-serial input.
As explained in Sect. 3, at least one overflow bit is needed
to implement the Montgomery algorithm without final re-
duction. Because we use 16x16 multipliers, we extended
this idea to 16 overflow bits, resulting in Alg. 4. Because the
dedicated multipliers are “free”, this does not lead to a sub-
stantial area overhead compared to an ASIC-oriented data
path with only one overflow bit. Applying this technique to
the three configuration modes, leads to a multiplier with an
operand width of 1056 bits (determined by the second mode,
requiring two 512+16 multiplications in parallel). This re-
sults in a total of 66 16x16 multipliers, which made us de-
cide to use a Spartan XC3S4000 with an availability of 96
dedicated multipliers. Besides dedicated multiplier blocks,
our integer multiplier also contains 66 Carry-Save Adders
(CSAs) and 2 Ripple Carry Adders (RCAs).
As can be seen from Fig. 1, one of the operands is pro-
vided in parallel (X), while the other one is inserted in a
sequential manner (Y ). This leads to Fig. 2, which depicts
Fig. 2. Data path
the complete data path. To perform point doubling and point
addition for ECC in parallel, two ripple-carry adders are im-
plemented. To share the input registers between the adders
and the multiplier, the adders use the same data path width
of 16 bits. Figure 2 also shows that a RAM bank is used
to store intermediate values. This RAM bank consists of 66
dedicated RAM blocks with a width of 16 bits and a depth of
1024. All blocks are controlled by the same address value,
but can be enabled separately. This makes it possible to have
them storing the 16-bit outputs of the multiplier in a correct
way.
To reduce the number of multiplexors, the data path only
allows two multiplications or two additions in parallel. An
addition in parallel with a multiplication is not possible. The
algorithms for point doubling and point addition in ECC,
which consist of many modular multiplications and addi-
tions, are rewritten for this specific architecture.
In summary, this paragraph shows that the data path is
designed with side-channel resistance awareness. This is
achieved by balancing the algorithms for RSA and ECC.
The next paragraph explains which algorithms are imple-
mented and gives some implementation results.
4.2. Functional Description
The coprocessor does not only provide modular exponentia-
tion for RSA and point multiplication for ECC. It also gives
the user the possibility to access the lower-level functions,
such as modular multiplication, integer multiplication, etc.
The hierarchy of operations is shown in Fig. 3, where level
1 corresponds to the lowest level and level 4 to the top level.
The lowest level is the only one that interfaces with the data
path, while higher levels only communicate with lower lev-
els in the hierarchy. This strategy reduces the number of
Fig. 3. Hierarchy of instructions
multiplexors needed to access the data path. The user can
access these operations by an 8-bit command value, cmd,
together with a start signal. A valid output signal indicates
that the result of the operation is ready. The inputs to the
operations have to be written to fixed RAM addresses and
the output can be read from a fixed RAM address.
In more detail, the coprocessor provides the following
functions:
1. • 256, 512, 1024, 2048 bit multiplication
• 256, 512, 1024, 2048, 4096 bit addition / sub-
traction
2. • 256, 512, 1024, 2048, 4096 bit modular addition
/ subtraction
• 256, 512, 1024, 2048, 4096 bit modular multi-
plication
• 1024 → 512, 2048 → 1024, 4096 → 2048 bit
modular reduction
3. • 512, 1024, 2048, 4096 bit modular exponentia-
tion (RSA)
• 256 bit point doubling/addition
4. • 160, 256 bit point multiplication
• 1024, 2048, 4096 bit RSA-CRT
The main contribution of this work is in terms of side-
channel security. RSA and RSA-CRT are implemented with-
out conditional branches (to prevent SPA attacks) and with
key blinding (to prevent DPA attacks). ECC is implemented
with balanced algorithms (to prevent SPA attacks) and with
key blinding and point randomization (to prevent DPA at-
tacks).
The final result is a secure PKC coprocessor that runs at
a frequency of 66 MHz and occupies 57% of the slices, 66
dedicated multipliers and 66 RAM blocks of a Xilinx Spar-
tan XC3S4000 FPGA. Although the focus of our coproces-
sor is on secure design using dedicated FPGA features, we
still give the latency of three main functions:
• 1024 bit RSA: 11.1 ms
• 1024 bit RSA-CRT: 4.0 ms
• 160 bit ECC: 17.4 ms
5. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we present an FPGA implementation of a co-
processor for public key cryptography. In order to obtain
side-channel security, the algorithms for RSA and ECC are
balanced. Accordingly, the data path has to support these
side-channel precautions, which affect the area of the imple-
mentation. To compensate for this area increase, we made
optimal use of the dedicated multipliers and RAM blocks
on a Spartan XC3S4000 FPGA. The resulting performance
meets the requirements of a broad range of applications.
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